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Seay: Involuntary Commitment of Alcoholics

COMMENTARY
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF ALCOHOLICS*
Alcoholism has been termed the nation's number one drug problem.' In
1970 one-third of all arrests made in the United States were for public drunkenness. 2 The Florida Legislature's concern over the magnitude of the alcoholism problem and its conclusion that "[d]ealing with public inebriates as
criminals has proved expensive, unproductive, burdensome, and futile 3 are,
therefore, understandable. The cost of alcoholism to Florida industry and
government has been estimated at over $100 million annually.4 These estimates
probably fall far short of the true monetary impact of alcoholism on society. 5
On July 1, 1973, legislation became effective, supplying a statutory mechanism for the involuntary commitment of alcoholics for treatment. 6 As originally enacted this legislation also provided for the simultaneous repeal of all
state and local intoxication and drunkenness statutes, but repeal has since been
postponed until October 1, 1974.7 These provisions are part of the Comprehensive Alcoholism Prevention, Control, and Treatment Act," an earlier portion of which became effective July 1, 1971. This commentary will examine
the provision for involuntary commitment of alcoholics and suggest changes to
the present statute.
0
EnrroR's NoTE: This commentary received the University of Florida Law Review Alumni
Association Commentary Award as the outstanding commentary submitted during the spring
1973 quarter.
1. Committee Comment to Senate Bill 439 (1971 Regular Session of Florida Legislature)
of Senate Committee on Health, Welfare, and Institutions, at 1. This committee sponsored
the bill, which was enacted as FiA. STAT. ch. 396 (1971).
2. Id.
3. FxA. STAT. §396.022(4) (1971).
4. Letter from Joseph C. Ziesenheim, Chief, Bureau of Alcoholic Rehabilitation, to
William D. Rogers, M.D., Director, Florida Division of Mental Health, Mar. 16, 1971. Mr.
Ziesenheim estimated that problem drinkers annually cost Florida employers "[a]t least $72
million" and the State, as an employer, more than $6 million. He also listed losses due to
misspent welfare funds at approximately $17.8 million per year and the costs of arresting,
trying, and incarcerating individuals committing the four basic alcohol-related offenses
(public intoxication, driving while intoxicated, and alcohol-related vagrance and disorderly
conduct) at over $4.7 million per year. Additionally, a degree of intoxication was involved
in an estimated 45% of all felony arrests in 1970.
5. See Stevenson, The Emergence of Non-Skid-Row Alcoholism as a "Public" Problem,
45 TEMP.L.Q. 529 (1972). The economic impact of drinking drivers is examined in Kornblum
& Blinder, The Alcoholic Driver: A Proposal for Treatment as an Alternative to Punish.
ment, 50 INS. L.J. 133 (1972).
6. FLA. STAT. §396.161 (1971) (enacted in 1971).
7. FLA. STAT. §396.161 (1971). In an extension of the regular session of 1973, the repealing of these statutes was delayed until the 1974 date to allow additional time for the
organization of local treatment facilities.
8. FLA. STAT. ch. 396 (1971). The Comprehensive Act provides for the establishment and
maintenance of a program for the control of drunkenness and the prevention and treatment of alcoholism throughout Florida. It details the duties and functions of the Divisions
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PRIOR LAW
After 1941 chronic alcoholics were deemed not "receivable patients" and

thus were excluded from admission to state hospitals.9 Although this exclusion
was repealed by a section of the Baker Act,10 Florida's recent legislation dealing with community mental health, it is not dear what part that Act plays in
the treatment of chronic alcoholics. Its language detailing the procedure for
voluntary commitment to a state hospital" seems to indicate that a chronic
alcoholic could admit himself.12 Nevertheless, the provisions for involuntary
hospitalization1 3 state that one may be hospitalized if "mentally ill and likely
to injure himself or others if not hospitalized."'- Most alcoholics are not likely
to meet this two-fold requirement. 1
The use of involuntary commitment for treatment of alcoholics is not new
in Florida. Commitment provisions were enacted in 1951 allowing a period
not to exceed 180 days in which one could be committed against his will to be
treated for alcoholism. 6 Two years later this statute was repealed" and replaced by legislation authorizing construction of a state alcoholic rehabilitation center in Highlands County.' 8 Admission to the rehabilitation center was
strictly voluntary. 9 Although proposals for involuntary treatment of Florida's
alcoholics were subsequently made,2 0 the 1971 statute21 was the first to receive
22
legislative approval.
of Mental Health; outlines the treatment and rehabilitation program; and contains the
voluntary, emergency, and involuntary treatment provisions. The Act also covers the promulgation of regulations concerning acceptance for treatment, confidentiality of patients'
records, visitation and communication privileges, payments for treatment, penalties for
furnishing false information to secure involuntary hospitalization, immunity from liability
for certain personnel, and the repeal of all existing state and local intoxication and public
drunkenness statutes. An advisory board is also established.
9. Fla. Laws ch. 20504, §5 (1941) (appears as FLA. STAT. §394.26 (1971), repealed by
Fla. Laws ch. 71-131, §16 (1971)).
10. Fla. Laws ch. 71-131, §16 (1971).
11. FrLA. STAT. §394.465 (1971).
12. The exact wording of FA. STAT. §394.465 (1971) is: "A facility may receive for
observation, diagnosis [or] treatment any individual eighteen (18) years of age or older making application for admission, any individual under eighteen (18) years of age for whom
such application is made by his parent or guardian, [or] any person legally adjudged to be
incompetent for whom such application is made by his guardian."
13. FLA. STAT. §394.465 (1971).
14. Id.
15. FLA. STAT. §394.455(3) (1971) defines "mentally ill" as "having a mental, emotional

or behavioral disorder which substantially impairs the person's mental health."
16.
17.
18.
19.
to the

FLA. STAT. §396.11 (1951).
Fla. Laws ch. 28134, at 14 (1953).
FLA. STAT. §396.031 (1953).
Fla. Stat. §396.061 (1953) (repealed 1971). This requirement for voluntary entrance
facility apparently continues under the 1971 legislation. See FLA. STAT. §396.052(1)(d)

(1971).
See Note, The Revolving Door Cycle in Florida,20 U. FLA. L. Ray. 344, 352-53 (1968).
21. FA. STAT. §396.102 (1971).
22. The previously proposed legislation is discussed in Note, supra note 20. "The pro20.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss1/7

2

Seay: Involuntary Commitment of Alcoholics

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

IMPETUS FOR DECRIMINALIZING ALCOHOLISM

Those who had long urged decriminalization of alcoholism were offered
hope by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. California2 3 that enforcement of a California statute making it a criminal offense
to be addicted to the use of narcotics was unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment2 4 Narcotics addiction was recognized by the Court as an
illness rather than a crime.2 5 A footnote to the opinion, quoted from appellee's
brief, stated: "[I]t is generally conceded that a narcotic addict, particularly
one addicted to the use of heroin, is in a state of mental and physical illness.
28
So is an alcoholic."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal applied this "cruel and unusual punishment" argument of Robinson to the public intoxication conviction of a
2
7 The appellant had argued that his
chronic alcoholic in Driver v. Hinnant.
while
intoxicated
was symptomatic of his addiction to
appearance in public
alcohol, "unwilled and ungovernable by the victim." '2 8 The court accepted this

rationale and stated: "[T]he State cannot stamp an unpretending chronic
alcoholic as a criminal if his drunken public display is involuntary as the result of disease. "

2 9

A similar prelude to a direct Supreme Court decision on alcoholism was
Easter v. District of Columbia"o in which the District of Columbia court held
that chronic alcoholism is a defense to a charge of public intoxication and is
not itself a crime. 1 It was pointed out in Easter32 that other cases33 contain
language suggesting the constitutionality of confinement for inquiry or treatment.3 4 Nevertheless, in Powell v. Texas35 the Supreme Court upheld by a

posed legislation would have provided a nonpunitive procedure for ordering hospitalization
and treatment of alcoholics. After the filing of a written petition, the county judge was to
conduct a hearing and indigent alleged alcoholics would have been afforded court appointed
counsel. To aid in the determination whether the alleged alcoholic was in fact an alcoholic,
an examining committee would have been appointed. If the individual were found to be
an alcoholic, the committee was to recommend treatment." Note, supra note 20, at 353
(footnotes omitted).
23. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
24. Id. at 667.
25. Id.
26. Id. n.8.
27. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
28. Id. at 764.
29. Id. at 765. However, the court further stated that appropriate detention of the
alcoholic for treatment and rehabilitation is not proscribed "so long as he is not marked
a criminal."
30. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 53-55.
33. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th
Cir. 1966).
34. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761,
765 (4th Cir. 1966).
35. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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5-4 decision the conviction of an alleged chronic alcoholic for public intoxication. There was no majority opinion, and a careful reading of the various
opinions indicates that on a different trial record the Court might have followed the lead of Easter and Driver in declaring punishment for a symptom of
chronic alcoholism cruel and unusual. 36
THE FLORIDA SCHEME OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
37
The statutory section allowing involuntary commitment of alcoholics
provides that a petition for commitment may be filed by any of several persons 38 alleging "[t]hat the person is an alcoholic who has lost the power of
self-control with respect to the use of alcoholic beverages."3 9 Furthermore, a
petitioner must allege that the one whose commitment is sought has threatened, attempted or actually inflicted physical harm on himself or others, or
that he needs medical treatment and lacks the ability to make a rational decision in that regard due to his alcoholism. 40 Certification by a licensed physician that his examination supports the allegations of the petition is also
required. 41 The local circuit court must give notice of the hearing to all
interested parties42 and hold the hearing within ten days of its receipt of the
petition. After hearing all relevant evidence, 43 if the court finds that the
grounds for commitment have been met by clear and convincing proof, it
shall "commit the person to treatment at or through a treatment resource
44
deemed appropriate by the court."

36. An interesting analysis of the Powell opinion detailing the four separate opinions
filed appears in Bason, Chronic Alcoholism and Public Drunkenness-Quo Vadimus Post
Powell, 19 Am. U.L. REv. 48 (1970). The author's conclusion is that a more complete trial
record might provide the impetus for an overruling of Powell. Id. at 64. See also Fingarette,
The Perils of Powell: In Search of a Factual Foundation for the "Disease Concept of
Alcoholism," 83 HAxv. L. Ruv. 793 (1969); Note, The Chronic Alcoholic v. The Public

Drunkenness Statute, 73 W. VA. L. Rxv. 258 (1971).
37. FrA. STAT. §396.102 (1971).

38. The complete list found in FrA. STAT. §396.102(1) (1971) is "spouse or guardian, any
next of kin, the certifying physician, the head of any state treatment and research center,
the sheriff of the county where such person resides or is found, or any three citizens of the
state."
39.

FLA. STAT. §396.102(1)(a) (1971).

40. FiA. STAT. §396.102(1)(b) (1971).
41. FIA. STAT. §396.102(1)(b)(2) (1971). The examination must have been conducted
within two days prior to submission of the petition. A refusal to undergo such examination
must also be alleged.
42. FLA. STAT. §396.102(2) (1971). Notice must be given to the petitioner, to the person
whose commitment is sought, to his next of kin other than the petitioner, to his parents or
legal guardian if he is a minor, to the head of the facility to which he has been committed
if he has been committed for emergency care, and to any other 'person whose presence the
court deems advisable.
43. FLA. STAT. §396.102(3) (1971). If the person whose commitment is sought has refused to be examined by a licensed physician, or if more medical evidence is believed
necessary, ihe court is given the power to commit him to a treatment facility for not more
than five days for purposes of a diagnostic examination.
44. Id.
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The initial commitment to treatment is for a period of thirty days unless
the treatment resource to which a person is committed chooses to discharge
him sooner.4 5 The treatment resource may apply for recommitment for an
additional ninety-day period on the same grounds required for initial commitment. This application for extension is required if the original ground for
commitment was "danger to self or others" unless a likelihood of such danger
no longer exists. "6 After the initial thirty- and ninety-day commitments, further

extensions are in six-month increments. 4 Once committed to a treatment resource a person may be required to undergo any treatment deemed advisable
by the treatment resource. 48 This includes treatment by inpatient, outpatient,
49
and intermediate care facilities.
The person whose commitment is sought is notified that he may contest all
proceedings for commitment and recommitment5 ° may be examined by a
physician of his choice, 5' and may have counsel appointed.5 2- Discharge from
commitment 53 prior to the end of the court-ordered period is directed in the
case of one initially committed because of danger of physical harm when that
danger no longer existsY4 In the case of one needing medical treatment and

care, discharge is also directed when the incapacity to make such a determination of his needs no longer exists, or when further treatment will not significantly improve his condition.5 5
LEGAL AsPECTS OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT

The first problem encountered in Florida's involuntary commitment provision is one of definition. While the section of definitions in the Comprehensive Act lists two categories of persons classified as "alcoholics," 581 the involuntary commitment provision lists only one of those categories as subject
to commitment: the alcoholic who has lost the power of self-control with respect to the use of alcoholic beverages.5 7 The definition of "alcoholic" in the

45. FLA. STAT. §396.102(4) (1971).
46. Id.

47.
48.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§396.102(5) (1971).
§396.102(7) (1971).

49. Id.
50. FLA. STAT. §396.102(9) (1971).
51. Id. This section also provides for the court appointment of a physician to examine
the person if he cannot afford a private physician.
52. Id.
53. FLA. STAT. §396.102(10) (1971) provides that discharge may be sought by writ of
habeas corpus.

54.

FLA. STAT.

§396.102(8)(a) (1971).

55. FLA. STAT. §396.102(8)(b) (1971).
56. FLA. STAT. §396.032(8) (1971) defines "alcoholic" as "any person who chronically
and habitually uses alcoholic beverages to the extent that it injures his health or substantially
interferes with his social or economic functioning, or to the extent that he has lost the
power of self-control with respect to the use of such beverages."
57. FLA. STAT. §396.102(1)(a) (1971). The Model Act (Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act) prepared for the National Institute of Mental Health, by Legislative Drafting
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definitions section of the Florida statute is identical to the one found in the
similar Maryland act.58 This act established a program that was examined by
the Florida Bureau of Alcoholic Rehabilitation prior to submitting recommendations for legislation.59 The Maryland provision for involuntary commitment requires that a person whose commitment is sought be a "chronic
alcoholic." 60 The ambiguity in the Florida statute, caused by omission from
the involuntary commitment provision of the alcoholic who so chronically and
habitually uses alcohol that it injures his health or interferes with his social
or economic functioning, may cause difficulty. Problems may arise where one
whose commitment is sought contends that though he suffers social or economic
impairment, he has not lost the power of self-control through the use of
alcohol.
One who meets the definition of "alcoholic" may be involuntarily committed for either of two reasons. First, commitment is permissible if one has
threatened, attempted, or inflicted physical harm on himself or others. Second,
one may be committed if he is in need of medical treatment and, due to his
chronic alcoholism, is incapable of appreciating or making rational decisions
in regard to his need for care.
Commitment of a person dangerous to himself or others is doctrinally
justifiable either on the grounds of the state's police power-' or on the basis
2
While danger to others is a clear justification for exercise
of parens patriae.6
of the police power, danger to self is not so easily accepted as a justification for
commitment on either ground. 63 Indeed, it has been postulated that danger to
self or others by itself is not a sufficient reason for commitment unless it is
accompanied by a mental or physical condition that calls for medical treatment.6 4

Research Fund of Columbia University, July 18, 1969, (app. 18, at 211), which provided
the basis for Florida's Act, has an abbreviated definition of "alcoholic" and a separate
definition of "loss of self-control with respect to the use of alcoholic beverages." "Alcoholic"

is there defined as any person who chronically, habitually or periodically uses alcoholic
beverages to the extent that they injure his health or substantially interfere with his social
or economic functioning." Id. at 214. Loss of self-control is defined as "to lose the power

to abstain from alcoholic beverages, or to lose the power to refrain from drinking to
intoxication whenever drinking an alcoholic beverage." Id. at 214-15.
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2c, §103(b) (Supp. 1972).
59. Fla. Division of Mental Health, Report of Alcoholism Task Force at 193 (Feb. 12,

1971).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2c, §306(a) (Supp. 1972). Since the definitions section of the
Florida Act is identical to the Maryland Act and the pertinent section of the involuntary
commitment statute is identical to the Model Act, it seems likely that the partial omissions
of Florida's Act are due to the fact that separate sections were taken from separate sources.
61. See F. GRAD, A. GOLSBERG - B. Sn- mo, ALCOHOLISM AND THE LAw 73 (1971).
62. Id. at 72.
63. Id. at 78-79.

64. L. Tao, Alcoholism, Drunkenness and the Law, September 1969 (unpublished thesis
in Cornell Law School Library). The author points out that under the standards both
tuberculars and venereal disease carriers could be committed, since they present a danger to
themselves or others and they have a treatable medical condition. Id. at 149. See also Tao,
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There is little legal support for the proposition that one may be treated
against his will when the only danger he presents is danger to himself. Application of Georgetown College6" required a dying mother to receive a blood
transfusion over her objection on religious grounds on the theory that her
young children had a right to her services. A year later, however, a contrary
result was reached on similar facts. 66 One who refuses to seek treatment, although self-destructive or suicidal when intoxicated, might be found to lack
judgmental capacity in regard to his need for treatment. Nevertheless, if a
religious objection to treatment is raised, no solution can be found within
the Florida statute.
It is toward the alcoholic whose judgment is impaired that the second
ground for involuntary commitment under the Florida statute is directed. Not
only must he be in need of medical treatment,67 but his chronic alcoholism
must have impaired his judgment to such an extent that he is incapable of
appreciating his need for care and making a rational decision with regard to
his condition.68 Furthermore, it is expressly provided that "a mere refusal to
undergo treatment shall not ... by itself constitute evidence of lack of judgment with respect to the need for care." 69 The legal justification proffered for

this type of involuntary commitment is the doctrine of parens patriae, a
sovereign's power of guardianship over persons under some disability.70
The Draftsman's Notes to the Model Act71 and comments in a book by the
director of the Model Act Project 72 indicate that the question for determination in this type of involuntary commitment is primarily a medical one. The
judgmental incapacitation must be great enough to justify govermental interference with one's decision not to undergo treatment. Mere poor judgment is
not enough. A ready example of this standard is the fact that though both
cigarette smoking and obesity are hazardous to one's health,- there is no

Criminal Drunkenness and the Law, 54 Iowa L. REv. 1054 (1969); Tao, Legal Problems of
Alcoholism, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 405 (1969).
65. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). See also Winters v. Miller,
446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1972); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp.,
340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
66. In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 561, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). This question has not
been decided by the Florida courts.
67. FLA. STAT. §596.102(l)(b)(2) (1971).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. L. Tao, supra note 64.
71. Draftsmen's Notes to Model Act, supra note 57, at 13 provides: "Commitment would
not be warranted merely because the person is an alcoholic and in need of treatment, or
because he is an alcoholic and likely to commit property crimes, or likely to appear repeatedly in public intoxicated, or has disturbed his family or other social relationships. Commitment would be warranted, however, when the alcoholic exhibits cognitive deficiencies,
generally confused thinking or other manifestation of disorientation which shows an inability
to make judgments about areas of behavior that do not directly relate to his drinking
problem."
72. F. GRAD, A. GOLSnERG &B. SHAPuRo, supra note 61, at 78.
73. Id. at 72.
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mechanism for requiring one to undergo treatment in order to stop smoking
or lose weight.74
Involuntary commitment- s and other alternatives to punishment for intoxication 6 are gaining popularity as more enlightened approaches to the handling
of the problem of alcoholism. This trend may be partially due to the success
of increased use of civil commitment for the treatment of narcotics addicts.77
There have been several expressions of doubt, however, concerning the legality
of "treating" rather than "punishing." 78 Language from several cases dealing
with treatment as an alternative to punishment in general and for alcoholism
in particular commands the use of treatment,79 but other Supreme Court cases
have indicated an uneasiness over the practical results of civil restraint. 0 Additionally, the Court has shown a readiness to strike down commitments that
are procedurally deficient.". Further, in Powell, the Court's most recent holding in the area of alcoholism, a warning was given against "hanging a new
sign reading 'Hospital' over one wing of the jail house."8 2
The use of civil commitment for alcoholics should be subjected to dose
scrutiny not only to determine if there is a valid basis for the deprivation of
personal liberty,8 3 but also to insure that the one whose commitment is sought
84
has been afforded due process.

74. See Anderson 9- Whitmen, The Control of Behavior Through Law: Theory and
Practice,47 Noran DAME. LAw. 815, 84849 (1972) (examination of aid that psychology and
psychiatry can give to other disciplines in accomplishing certain goals and exposition of
differing attitudes toward one's choice regarding health questions in mental and physical
areas).
75. Koshiba, Treatment of Public Drunkenness in Hawaii, 7 Am. L.Q. 228 (1969); Comment, Civil Commitment of Alcoholics in Texas, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 159 (1969).

76. See Levin, The San Francisco Court School for Alcoholism Prevention, 53 A.B.AJ.
1043 (1967).
77. See Aronowitz, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 67 COLUm. L. Rxv. 405 (1967);

Kramer, Bass &Berecochea, Civil Commitment for Addicts: The CaliforniaProgram, 125 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 816-23 (1968).
78. Bazelon, Alcoholism: An Ounce of Prevention, 43 J. AM. Jun. Soe'y 408, 411-12 (1969).
Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit Court expresses his concern over the idea of exchanging "striped uniforms ... for white smocks." His suggestion is that greater emphasis
be placed on prevention of alcoholism.
79. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
80. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). However, there appear to be no procedural deficiencies in the Florida Act regarding notice, right
to be heard, et cetera.
82. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968).
83. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
84. FLA. STAT. §396.102 (1971) contains provisions for -adequate notice, representation of
counsel, notification of right to contest any and al proceedings, right to be examined by
one's own physician and right to have both counsel and a physician appointed by the court
if the person whose commitment is sought so desires and is unable to afford same. See
F. GRAD, A. GoLsBERG &B. Smivmo, supra note 61, at 88-98.
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MEDICAL ASPECTS

In examining a procedure providing for treatment rather than punishment,
it is necessary to deal with the current state of medical knowledge of alcoholism. There is no general agreement on either the causes 5 of alcoholism or its
best treatment." "[A]lthough numerous kinds of therapy and intervention
appear to have been effective with various kinds of problem drinkers, the
process of matching patient and treatment method is not yet highly devel87

oped."

The range of medical opinions on proper treatment is represented by an
article containing differing views of two psychiatrists. 8 One psychiatrist emphasizes the appropriateness of psychotherapy and warns against the use of
nonprofessionals, such as Alcoholics Anonymous members, in a therapeutic
role;8 9 his fellow practitioner urges proper training of nonpsychotherapeutic
personnel to deal with the broad range of problems that the total alcoholic
population contains. 90 Other doctors are reluctant to endorse the notion of
alcoholism as a disease because of the public tendency to conclude that doctors
will readily accept alcoholics as patients and that the solution to the problem
is purely medical. 91 "Labeling alcoholism as a disease does not make it immediately amenable to medical approaches, nor does it make it the sole responsibility of physicians." 92 At present, the most sensible conclusion seems
to be that alcoholism must be attacked on several levels if it is to be overcome
successfully. 93

Even assuming medical treatment of alcoholism is effective, there remains
the question of whether treatment should be administered involuntarily.
Furthermore, Thomas Szasz, psychiatrist and chief spokesman for opponents

85. F. KANT, THE TREATMENT OF THE ALCOHOLIC 29-34 (1954). Kant outlines various
theories of causation ranging from metabolic disease to latent homosexuality. His opinion

is that there is no one cause but that alcoholism is "a psychobiological-sociological problem,
which means that certain mental and physical traits have to be present in a certain sociological setting so that alcoholism will develop." Id. at 32.
86. R. CANTANZARO, ALCOHOLISM -THE
TOTAL TREATMENT APPROACH xvii-xviii (1968).
The author lists nine different methods of treating alcoholism including group therapy,
conditioned

reflex

therapy,

hypnotherapy,

antabuse

therapy,

other

pharmacologic

and

metabolic therapies, counseling, social casework, vocational rehabilitation and LSD therapy.
87. JOINT INFORMATION SERVICE OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION AND THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR MENTAL HEALTH, THE TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM, A STunY OF
PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS 13 (1967). See E. JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM

(1960).
88. Krystal & Moore, Who Is Qualified To Treat the Alcoholic?, 24
ALCOHOL 705 (1963).

Q.J.

SrtuDIs ON

89. Id. at 710.
90. Id. at 717.
91. Finn & Clancy, Alcoholism, Dilemma or Disease: A Recurring Problem for the
Physician, 13 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 133 (1972).

92.

Id. at 137.

93.

See Liebson, The Token Economy as a Research Method in Alcoholism, 45 PSYCHI-

ATRC Q. 574 (1971), detailing the results of an experiment involving reinforcement of abstinence by the use of token economies.
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of mandatory treatment, has asserted that mental hospitals are analogous to
prisons94 and that mental illness is socially rather than organically determined. 95
Some commentators believe that one of the reasons for failure in the treatment of alcoholics is the poor motivation of subjects.96 It is difficult to imagine
a patient more poorly motivated than one who is being treated against his
will. Because of this motivational problem and medical disdain for involuntary
treatment of any sort, courts should exercise restraint in the use of Florida's
provision.
The work of psychologists indicates that incarceration may actually aggravate alcoholism by increasing the fears and anxieties of one whose abuse
of alcohol stems from an inability to handle normal fears and anxieties. 97 If
involuntary treatment produces this same anxiety in an alcoholic, similar aggravation of his condition may occur. Researchers studying alcoholism have,
however, come to different conclusions concerning the effectiveness of involuntary treatment. Some have claimed substantial cure rates, 98 while others
have indicated serious problems with the use of this type of treatment.99 The
findings of a recent project designed to examine the efficacy of compulsory
clinical treatment for chronic alcoholic offenders led the director of the project
to conclude that "compulsory clinic treatment of this 'revolving-door' alcoholic
group was a marked failure." 00 Since neither doctors nor researchers have
reached a consensus in favor of mandatory treatment, it seems that involuntary
commitment of alcoholics is inappropriate as a frequently and indiscriminately
applied technique.

94. Sander, Some Thoughts on Thomas Szasz, 125 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1429 (1969).
95. Id. Szasz, an outspoken critic of the paternalistic treatment of unwilling patients in
the name of love and concern, has said: "[J]ustice and freedom are closely related . . . if
freedom is debased, so is justice." See Szasz, Justice in the Therapeutic State, 11 COMPREnamsrvF PSYCHIATRY 433, 442 (1970). However, some medical authorities favor involuntary
treatment of alcoholics. Cf. KANT, supra note 85, at 35-36; Rehrer, Proposed Involuntary
Commitment for Alcoholics, 52 J. FLA. MA. 100, 101 (1965).
96. See Bennett, Reasons for Failure in the Treatment of Alcoholism, 8 RFCENT ADVANCES IN BIOLOGICAL PSYCIATRY 9 (1965). Other reasons listed by the author include
alcoholic brain damage, inadequate social outlets, poor mental or family adjustments, or
both, lack of responsibility, rejection of Alcoholics Anonymous, financial problems, and
sociopathic personality disorders.
97. See Singer, PsychologicalStudies of Punishment, 58 CALr. L. REv. 405, 422 (1970).
98. Gallant & Faulkner, Enforced Clinic Treatment of Paroled Criminal Alcoholics: A
Pilot Evaluation,28 Q.J. STuDEs ON ArOHOL 743 (1967).
99. R. Cantanzaro, supra note 86, at 44-50, details two involuntary treatment programs,

one in the federal correctional facility in La Tuna, Texas, and one in British Columbia. The
researcher's conclusion was that those who are incorrectly diagnosed as alcoholics have a
detrimental effect on others in the program where a group therapy program is utilized. Id.
at 341.
100. Gallant, Evaluation of Compulsory Treatment of the Alcoholic Municipal Court
Offender, in REcEr ADvANCEs IN STunsxs oF ALCOHOLISM 730, 742 (N. Mello & J. Mendelson

ed. 1971).
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Some proponents of involuntary commitment answer opposing arguments
with the assertion that one who seeks treatment for alcoholism or some other
alcohol-related problem rarely does so without the coercion of some person or
situation.101 Some professionals involved with alcoholism contend that those
receiving treatment are generally doing so because of a threatened divorce, a
lost job, a conviction for drunkenness or driving while intoxicated, or a similar
occurrence. Proper use of the power of a court to involve a patient in a treatment program against his will requires recognition of the statutory distinction
between voluntary and involuntary treatment. As previously noted, 0 2 legal
authorization for sweeping use of involuntary commitment for treatment has
not developed. Several sources,' 0 3 including Florida's statute, 0 4 indicate the
strong preference for voluntary treatment. These factors, combined with the
medical controversy over involuntary treatment, indicate that this procedure
should be viewed with suspicion and used with restraint.
One way to safeguard the rights of those for whom commitment is sought
is for courts to acknowledge the basically medical nature of the determinations
that must be made. Only a licensed physician is qualified under the statute to
make the determination of chronic alcoholism and, as indicated previously, 0 5
the question of judgmental impairment is also a medical one. While the
initial basis of danger to self or others is a question of fact,106 recommitment
hearings transfer even this category to the medical realm, since the question
on recommitment is the likelihood of an act, 0

7

a matter beyond the com-

petence of the court.'
Florida's involuntary commitment statute provides no protection for one
who might have religious objections to medical treatment. While counseling
or group therapy might be acceptable to such a person, other forms of treatment such as antabuse or drug therapy could conceivably be administered in
violation of his constitutionally protected religious freedom. 109
Furthermore, it is not clear that habeas corpus"o is an adequate means for
review of the legality of one's commitment. The Florida statute' sets forth
See Rehrer, supra note 95.
See text accompanying notes 79-82 supra. See also Tao, Legal Problems of AlcoholFORDHAm L. REv. 405, 423-25 (1969).
See Report of Alcoholism Task Force, supra note 59, at 56.
See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra.
See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
FLA. STAT. §396.102(1)(b)(I) (1971).
107. FLA. STAT. §396.102(8)(a) (1971).
108. There is some support for the proposition that potential dangerousness is not a
valid basis for confinement. See In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C.), af'd, 252 F.2d 629
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
109. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) (medication administered to a Christian Science mental patient, over objection, held violation of
freedom of religion).
110. FLA. STAT. §396.102(10) (1971).
Ill. FLA. STA. ch.79 (1971).
101.
102.
ism, 37
103.
104.
105.
106.
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neither the proper scope of a court's inquiry nor whether the findings of fact
sustaining commitment should be accepted or examined de novo. If the
statute allows one seeking discharge from commitment in a state court to
challenge only jurisdiction or provision of due process rights, there will be
no examination of the sufficiency of the grounds for commitment or recommitment. Alternatively, if the grounds for commitment are to be examined
de novo, court appointment of a physician, as well as a counsel, is necessitated
by the medical nature of the issues.
Though these uncertainties are not encountered by one seeking a writ of
habeas corpus under the federal statute,-1 2 it is not dear that the habeas corpus
remedy in state or federal court would result in a determination of whether
the grounds for commitment still exist. In any event, medical testimony would
be essential to this determination."13
Florida's commendable legislation offers some hope of solution to the
growing social problem of alcoholism, but this problem must not be solved at
the expense of unnecessary curtailment of the personal freedom of citizens,
alcoholic or otherwise. Certain changes to the statute could uphold the stated
legislative objectives and yet guard against possible injustices to the individual.
The rights and liberty of an alleged alcoholic should be safeguarded by
the addition to section 396.102 of language providing: "In implementation
of this section the court and the concerned treatment resources shall bear in
mind the stated legislative preference for voluntary rather than involuntary
treatment, as well as outpatient rather than inpatient treatment where involuntary treatment must be used."
Also, the entire definition of "alcoholic" in the definitions section of the
statute should be added to the involuntary commitment section. 1 4 Furthermore, religious freedom would be safeguarded by the addition of a section
providing: "In implementation of this section the court shall determine
whether the person whose commitment is sought has any objections to involuntary treatment on religious grounds, and, if so, shall limit the types of
treatment that may be administered accordingly."115
The habeas corpus provision section should be expanded by a statement
that:
Inquiry under this writ shall extend to the validity of the original proceedings and all subsequent proceedings, sufficiency of establishment of the
grounds for commitment in the original and all subsequent proceedings,
the current existence or non-existence of grounds for commitment, whether
beneficial treatment is actually being provided, and any other matters the

112. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1970). This section delineates eight grounds on which a federal
court may grant relief, including inadequate development of the facts and lack of a full, fair,
and adequate hearing.
113. See notes 105-108 and accompanying text supra. For recommitment, both categories
- danger to self or others and need of medical treatment - require medical testimony.
114. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text supra.
115. See text accompanying note 109 sup'a.
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court may consider appropriate"16 In all proceedings of this type the right
to examination by a physician of one's choice and appointment of a physhall be made if the party seeking the writ does not
sician by the court
117
obtain his own.
It is believed that the policies expressed by the legislature by the enactment
of this Act will be carried out with less risk of abuse and injustice by the

adoption of these modifications.
JAMEs E. L. SEY

116.
117.

See text accompanying notes 110-113 supra.
See text accompanying notes 71-78, 113 supra.
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